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The Liberties of the Church and the City of London
in Magna Carta
A KEITH THOMPSONQ1
Associate Professor and Associate Dean, Sydney School of Law, The University of Notre
Dame Australia
This article identifies the liberties of the Church and the City of London which were intended to
be protected by Magna Carta from 1215. The liberties intended were a recognition of a form of
autonomy for the Church and the City and have no connection with the individual freedoms
that are identified for protection by modern human rights instruments. The clauses in Magna
Carta conferring that autonomy are among the very few that have not been repealed, but they
have not been asserted for hundreds of years. While the idea of church autonomy has resonance
with the ideas of subsidiarity and sphere-sovereignty developed in Catholic and Calvinist social
teaching from the late nineteenth century, recent American jurisprudence suggests that
religious autonomy may be the best way to defend religious liberty in the future. This article
suggests that, just as English kings were persuaded to provide towns, colonial endeavours
and eventually corporate free enterprise with limited autonomy for a fee, so charters
conferring limited autonomy on religious communities may provide a philosophical and
practical basis from which to defend religious liberty in the future, even if the assertion of
individual religious liberty becomes politically incorrect.
Keywords: Magna Carta, liberty, autonomy, religious freedom
INTRODUCTION
The word ‘liberties’ appears ten times in the 1215 version of Magna Carta. Once it
is specific to the Church and twice to the City of London. One of the references is
specific to Welshmen, another to Alexander, the erstwhile King of Scotland, but
all the other references are generic references to the liberties granted or
acknowledged under the Charter as a whole. The references to the liberties of
the Church and of the City of London have not been the subject of a great
deal of commentary despite the 800th anniversary. My purpose in this article
is to try to part-fill that lacuna in the literature. I therefore set out the relevant
text of the 1215 version of the Charter in full.1
1 Note that, while the wording of the 1225 version varies slightly, the meaning so far as the Church and
City of London are concerned is unchanged and that is true for the 1297 version as well. Though the
versions of the Charter issued after 1215 removed reference to a baronial committee to oversee the
king’s compliance with the Charter, no dilution of the rights of the Church or the City of London
are detectable, confirming that these liberties were well known and accepted.
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Thereafter I identify the particular privileges of the Church and the City of
London that seem to have been intended by those phrases and I explain what
they meant in practice. In particular, I explain that the idea of religious
freedom addressed in Magna Carta is quite different from the idea of individual
religious freedom which is expressed in modern bills and charters of rights. The
idea of religious freedom assumed in Magna Carta is more like the idea of reli-
gious autonomy said by some contemporary United States (US) commentators
to have been confirmed by the establishment clause in the First Amendment to
the US Constitution. I also explain the relative independence of the City of
London, how it came about, why it was respected in practice and why the city
grew. I then suggest that the idea of religious and urban autonomy in Magna
Carta may be a progenitor of the twentieth-century idea of subsidiarity or sphere-
sovereignty and I discuss whether those ideas together are durable enough to
assist in defending modern religious institutions, and I note that the clauses
that confirmed the ancient liberties of the Church and of the City of London
as independent institutions have not been repealed.2 That review dismisses
the idea that the delegated but independent autonomy inherent in British char-
ters enabled the existence of ‘a state within a state’. But it does raise the question
as to whether contemporary Western governments could be convinced, for a fee
or otherwise, to charter semi-independent religious or political communities as
some did between the tenth and nineteenth centuries.
I conclude that, even though the idea of religious freedom expressed in our
most ancient British constitutional instruments has no relationship with the in-
dividual freedom celebrated in modern human rights instruments, the much
older idea of religious autonomy stands ready to enable a new evolution of reli-
gious liberty in the twenty-first century. In particular, I suggest that, while indi-
vidual religious rights may subside in the face of state insistence on
homogeneity and majority rule, associational religious liberty seems ready to re-
assert itself as groups of religious believers assemble to protect themselves
against contemporary attacks on their consciences.
THE TEXT
The 1215 version of Magna Carta3 includes the following clauses:
2 Note that the four unrepealed clauses of Magna Carta to which Lord Irvine referred (see nn 3–4
below) are to the 1225/1297 version of the Charter, and the Church and London liberties are there
set out in clauses 1 and 9 respectively.
3 In a December 2002 address delivered at Parliament in Canberra, Lord Irvine of Lairg, the former
Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, observed that ‘Magna Carta was re-issued four times, with various
amendments, and is now thought to have been confirmed by Parliament on almost fifty further occa-
sions’, citing F Thompson, Magna Carta: its role in the making of the English constitution 1300–1629,
(New York, 1972), ch 1.
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1. FIRST, THAT WE HAVE GRANTED TO GOD, and by this present charter
have confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English
Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and
its liberties unimpaired, and . . .
13. The City of London shall enjoy all its ancient liberties and free customs,
both by land and bywater.We alsowill and grant that all other cities, bor-
oughs, towns, and ports shall enjoy all their liberties and free customs.
These are not the most well known clauses in the Charter.4
Liberties of the Church
The meaning of the first clause is clarified a little by the text that follows. It
continues:
That we wish this so to be observed, appears from the fact that of our own
free will, before the outbreak of the present dispute between us and our
barons, we granted and confirmed by charter the freedom of the
Church’s elections – a right reckoned to be of the greatest necessity and
importance to it – and caused this to be confirmed by Pope Innocent
III. This freedom we shall observe ourselves, and desire to be observed
in good faith by our heirs in perpetuity.5
‘The freedom of Church elections’ is an oblique reference to a residue of the
long-running dispute between the Church in Europe and various kings and
emperors on that continent known as the Investiture Contest. The contest
was about who had the ultimate authority to select those who would hold eccle-
siastical offices in a kingdom. William the Conqueror had been in dispute with
successive popes for twenty years before he sailed for England. He settled his
personal dispute with Pope Alexander II with the help of Lanfranc, an Italian
cleric ministering in Normandy,6 whom he later appointed as his first
4 The first clause cited here, which concerned the liberties of the Church, is one of four (1, 9, 29 and
37) which remain on the English statute books (Irvine (see n 2), citingHalsbury’s Statutes, vol X, part
1, (London, 2001), pp 14–17). Note again, that Irvine’s references are to the clause numbers in the 1225
version.
5 King John renounced Magna Carta as soon as the immediate threat of baronial force had passed and,
despite his ongoing argument with Pope Innocent III, the latter also renounced it as ‘an affront to the
Church’s authority over the King and the papal territories of England and Ireland and released John
from his oath to obey it’: ‘This day in history: August 24, 1215’, History Australia & New Zealand
,http://www.historychannel.com.au/classroom/day-in-history/771/pope-declares-magna-carta-invalid.,
accessed 19 February 2016. According to this source, the Charter itself was created on 19 June 1215 and the
Pope renounced it on 24 August 1215. Other sources say that the king’s seal was affixed on 15 June 1215.
6 The Catholic Encyclopedia records that Pope Alexander II had been Lanfranc’s former student at Bec
in Normandy in France: ‘Pope Alexander II’, Catholic Encyclopedia ,http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/01286a.htm., accessed 19 February 2016. His chancellor, Hildebrand, who became Pope
Gregory VII, succeeded him in 1073.
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Archbishop of Canterbury.7 The settlement of William’s dispute with Pope
Alexander II saw him invested with ‘a banner to crusade under’ when he
invaded England, but William was never required to formally submit to Pope
Gregory VII’s later demand that William ‘swear fealty to him’ even though
‘William had sought a pope’s permission to invade England’.8
The independence of the English Church asserted by William with Lanfranc’s
support did not endure. Pope Gregory VII deposed the European Emperor
Henry IV in 1080 and with his successors gradually also asserted the ‘independ-
ence of the clergy from secular control’ in England.9 However, the Church inde-
pendence in England referred to in Magna Carta was not really complete until
the reign of William’s great-grandson Henry II. The dispute came to a head
when four of Henry’s knights went to Canterbury in 1170 to ‘rid him of that tur-
bulent priest’. After Archbishop Thomas Becket’s death, Henry was only able to
avert the excommunication of England by the personal public penance of
‘walking barefoot to Canterbury’10 and by his submission in 1172 ‘to a papal
legate on the heights of Avranches . . . [where] before its cathedral [he] publicly
renounced those portions of his 1164 Constitutions of Clarendon which had
been deemed “offensive”’11 by the Pope.
There are direct and oblique references to Church privileges in six of the later
clauses in the 1215 version of Magna Carta, but none of those suggest any specific
local abuse beyond dabbling in Church appointments and King John’s having
taken more tax or land than Edward the Confessor (r 1042–66) had done in
the early eleventh century.12 There is no reference anywhere in the document
or elsewhere which suggests that John had interfered with religious confession
7 T Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, fifth edition (London, 1956), p 11.
8 ‘William conquered England and its church’, Christianity.com, ,http://www.christianity.com/
church/church-history/timeline/901-1200/william-conquered-england-and-its-church-11629787.html.,
accessed 19 February 2016.
9 H Berman, Law and Revolution (Cambridge MA, 1983), pp 87 (quotation), 522.
10 Ibid, p 256.
11 Ibid. J Baker, ‘Magna Carta and personal liberty’ in R Griffith-Jones and M Hill (eds), Magna Carta,
Religion and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, 2015), pp 81–108 at p 86, considers that the references to the
liberties of the Church in the first chapter of Magna Carta would have been understood by all those
who learned their law in the Inns of Court as confirming ‘the freedom of the clergy from capital pun-
ishment for murder and felony’.
12 R Helmholz, ‘Magna Carta and the law of nations’, in Griffith-Jones and Hill, Magna Carta, pp 70–
80 at p 78, says that Magna Carta ‘established and fortified special privileges of Church and Clergy’
in Chapters 14, 22, 27, 55, 60 and 61. Chapter 14 provided that the king had to give the high clergy
(archbishops, bishops and abbots) an individual summons if he wanted to claim scutage (tax) from
them. Chapter 22 provided that fines levied on ecclesiastical clerks would ignore their ecclesiastical
income (benefices). Church jurisdiction in estate distribution was acknowledged in Chapter 27, and
the Archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton, was included in the committee of barons who
would review cases where it was alleged that King John had previously taken fines unjustly (to de-
termine whether they should be remitted) in Chapter 55 and to recover them by distraint if necessary
in Chapter 61. Chapter 60 appropriately held that all the free men of the kingdom (including the
clergy) would reciprocally observe the same principles in their dealings with others.
2 7 4 CHURCH AND C I T Y L I B E R T I E S I N MAGNA CAR TA
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
privilege, sanctuary or the practices which later became well known as ‘benefit of
clergy’.13
Sealed religious confession was well established in England by about the elev-
enth century,14 even though it was not made binding upon the whole of the
Church until the Fourth Lateran Council, which gathered at Rome’s Lateran
Palace on 11 November 1215, five months after the first version of Magna Carta
had been signed by King John.15 Abuses of both religious confession privilege
and sanctuary were addressed in the Statute Articuli Cleri of 1315 exactly a
century later, but neither privilege seems to have been making waves during
the reign of King John.
Magna Carta was not the first English charter in which the liberties of the
Church were asserted and confirmed. When Henry I (the fourth son of
William the Conqueror) took the throne in 1100, he had issued a charter
which confirmed the law as it had stood in the time of Edward the Confessor
and which confirmed the proprietary autonomy of the Church in these words:
because the kingdom had been oppressed by unjust exactions, I, through
fear of God and the love which I have toward you all, in the first place make
the holy church of God free, so that I will neither sell nor put to farm, nor
on the death of archbishop or bishop or abbot will I take anything from the
church’s demesne or from its men until the successor shall enter it. And I
take away all the bad customs by which the kingdom of England was un-
justly oppressed.16
Although William the Conqueror had been able to make ecclesiastical appoint-
ments through the assistance of Lanfranc while Alexander II was pope, the pol-
itical strength of subsequent popes saw the Church establish control of its
appointments and property by the end of the twelfth century. At Runnymede
in 1215, what the Church required was confirmation that King John’s new intru-
sions into its affairs – including its exile of some of its leaders – should stop.
The Church looked back to promises that had been made by John’s predecessors
as its authority for the principle that it was supposed to be free from such con-
tests with the king. John therefore promised that there would be no future inter-
ference with the Church’s internal election procedures, no exile of its leadership
13 See, for example, ‘What is benefit of clergy?’, The Law Dictionary, ,http://thelawdictionary.org/
benefit-of-clergy/., accessed 19 February 2016.
14 A Thompson, Religious Confession Privilege at Common Law (Leiden, 2011), pp 64–65.
15 See n 1 for detail about the various versions of the Great Charter. The original 1215 version of the Great
Charter was declared null and void and thus revoked within three months after it was issued in June
1215. There was therefore no version of the Great Charter operative in England when the Fourth
Lateran Council convened in Rome.
16 See ,http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/char-lib.htm. (accessed 19 February 2016), clause 1.
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and no taking of Church property in the absence of its leaders.17 Just as Henry I
had provided the Church with written assurances in 1100 that its property would
be sacrosanct, so the Church sought written assurance from John that its auton-
omy would be respected. In 1100, Henry I had referred to Edward the
Confessor’s respectful relationship with the Church before his father (the
Conqueror)’s arrival as the precedent when it came to an acceptable relationship
between king and Church. King John was therefore probably referring to the
same standard, but his commitment in Magna Carta does not seem clear.
That perception may, however, be the result of our misunderstanding, since
church political power of that order is foreign to us.
Ancient liberties of the City of London
The City of London’s charterial history is of similar vintage. William the
Conqueror had issued the City of London with its first charter in 1066, the
year of his conquest. But, even though there is no record of an earlier charter,
the City of London had already established its identity and autonomy. The
towns and cities that remained in Europe before the eleventh century had
been administrative centres left over from Roman times.18 Many of those admin-
istrative centres did not survive. But the revival of commerce and the needs of
the merchant classes spawned new centres which took advantage of unhappy
groups in the countryside looking for the opportunity to ‘climb from one
[social] class to another’.19 London survived as a ‘trading settlement’ with forti-
fied commercial quarters.20 Other cities in Europe that operated similarly
included Naples, Salerno, Bari, Syracuse, Palermo, Venice, Durazzo, Cologne
and Milan.
The change and growth in London was typical and was the result of a combin-
ation of economic, social, political, religious and legal factors. Surplus artisans
and craftsmen congregated in the developing towns to provide services to the
merchants. The merchants traded with farmers for surplus food and raw mate-
rials, which resulted from the ‘rapid increase in agricultural productivity in the
17 King John had achieved an ‘open breach with the Church’ after 1205, when he again interfered in
ecclesiastical appointments and ‘secure[d the bishopric of ] Winchester for his henchman Peter de
Roches’. The Pope’s resistance to similar efforts when a new archbishop was required at
Canterbury, King John’s exile of the Pope’s appointee, Stephen Langton, in 1208 and the Pope’s con-
sequential interdict on England, which excluded the laity from the sacraments, was not ended until
King John ‘knelt before the Pope’s representatives . . . offered a perpetual annual tribute of 1,000
marks’ and enabled the return of Archbishop Langton and other exiled clergy to England (N
Vincent, Magna Carta: a very short introduction (Oxford, 2012), pp 47–51).
18 Berman, Law and Revolution, p 357. Berman observes that, while the cities of ancient Greece ‘had
been self-contained, independent city-states’, the Roman Empire’s ‘thousands of cities . . . had
served chiefly as centers for administrative control . . . and had been governed by imperial officers’.
19 Ibid, pp 357, 360 (quotation). Berman observes that most of the Roman cities were gone by the ninth
century but some survived, particularly in southern Italy, because of Byzantine and Arab commercial
influence.
20 Ibid, pp 357–358.
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eleventh century’.21 Serfs, free peasants and apprentices who had become
masters and successful craftsmen in their own right followed the yellow brick
road to class mobility and fortune. Emperors, kings, dukes and lesser (seignior-
ial) rulers, as well as popes and bishops, improved their military position by
chartering towns which then attracted immigrants from the countryside. Not
all of the feudal lords were excited to lose their peasants, but they did not
have the power to reclaim their lost tenants before they were protected by the
cities and part of its fabric.
To avoid the risk that the cities and their inhabitants might become a law unto
themselves, those chartering the new cities required promises of obedience to
law in those documents. Control was problematic because these newly inde-
pendent townsfolk had also obtained and were keen to exercise ‘the right and
duty to bear arms’ in defence of their new homes. While this city-based military
service was voluntary in the sense that it was not paid and was extended in the
cities to include the peasants, it was made obligatory as part of the set of coven-
antal obligations which all new arrivals in the towns had to accept before they
were secure in their new places of residence.22
Harold Berman explains the religious and legal contribution to the rise and
independence of the new European towns and cities in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, including London, writing that they
were religious associations in the sense that each was held together by reli-
gious values and rituals, including religious oaths. Many of themwere sworn
communes (conjurations, ‘conspiracies’), and of these a considerable number
had been founded by insurrectionary organizations. Those that were formed
by merchants were often governed by a merchant guild, which was itself a
religious association, dedicated to charitable and other religious works as
well as to the regulation of business activities. Those that were established
by imperial, royal, ducal, or episcopal (or other ecclesiastical) initiative
were also conceived as brotherhoods and were held together by oaths.
To stress the religious character of the cities and towns is not to say that
they were ecclesiastical associations. They were wholly separate from the
Church, and in that sense were the first secular states of Europe.
Nevertheless, they derived much of their spirit and character from the
Church. Indeed it would have been astonishing if it had been otherwise,
since they emerged during the era of the Papal Revolution.23
21 Ibid, p 359.
22 Ibid, p 360. Peasants ‘had no such right military right or duty’ in the countryside, although they
could be called upon in special circumstances. Knights, conversely, had to be paid.
23 Ibid, p 362.
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The new eleventh- and twelfth-century towns and cities were also legal associa-
tions, since they were either formed or legitimised by their new charters.
Though London, as a leftover Roman administrative centre, had not been
founded by charter in the same way as some of the new European towns,
William’s charter for the city did confirm ‘the “basic liberties” of [her] citizens
. . . including substantial rights of self-government’.24 In this respect, London
and the new European towns stood in contrast with the developing cities of
the Middle East. The Islamic cities lacked corporate unity, were never sworn
communes, religious guilds or brotherhoods and were never incorporated or
given charters setting out the rights and liberties of the residents.25
The charters of Christian towns and cities were read aloud regularly and the
people who came to live in them became subject to covenant to adhere to their
charters.26 These commitments had more in common with the feudal contract
of vassalage than any modern sense of a bargained exchange. Still, when a
peasant or a craftsman came to reside in a town or city, he obtained a new
status and became subject to the small patrician group that ruled the place.
The relationship was covenantal and almost sacramental. To breach one’s cove-
nants and renounce one’s civic obligations would be to declare oneself an outlaw
and beyond the protection of the local city authorities, exposed once again
perhaps to one’s former and unhappy feudal lord.
William’s 1066 charter to the City of London is very short. Like the Coronation
Charter given to England by his fourth son, Henry I, 34 years later, it identifies
the laws and practices of Edward the Confessor as the gold standard. It says:
William the King friendly salutes William the Bishop, and Godfrey the por-
treve,27 and all the burgesses within London, both French and English.
And I declare, that I grant you to be all law-worthy, as you were in the
days of King Edward; and I grant that every child shall be his father’s
heir, after his father’s days; and I will not suffer any person to do you
wrong. God keep you.28
The City of London claims that it is ‘the oldest continuous municipal democracy
in the world’ and traces its ‘ancient rights and privileges’ to the time of Edward
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid, pp 362–363.
26 Ibid, p 393.
27 The name for the office which preceded that of mayor and eventually lord mayor. See G McBain,
‘Liberties and customs of London: are there any left?’, (2013) 1:2 International Law Research 32–95
at 35, ,http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ilr/article/download/28685/17142., accessed
19 February 2016.
28 See ‘The Conqueror’s charter’, ,http://www.elfinspell.com/PrimarySource1066.html., accessed
19 February 2016. McBain, ‘Liberties and customs of London’, p 36, says that the consequence of
this charter was ‘that all the citizens of London were freemen’ and were assured that their legal
rights in the courts were preserved according to law existing before the Conquest.
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the Confessor as acknowledged in the words of William’s Charter.29 The City’s
website also infers that the reason for William’s acknowledgement of London’s
rights was tied up in the fact that the City of London ‘was the major source of
financial loans to monarchs, who sought funds to support their policies at
home and abroad’ from ‘medieval to Stuart times’.30
Financial practicality probably also explains why London and Winchester
were exempted from William’s Domesday Book tax survey in 1086.31 William
had made a collective agreement with London and was happy with the taxation
arrangements that flowed. The nature of those arrangements is not set out in
the text of the 1066 Charter, but their existence is obvious in Henry I’s
expanded version of the Charter in 1129.32 Berman says that ‘the rights of
London citizens and of London as a city expanded dramatically’ in the two gen-
erations after 1066: ‘the two ruling “reeves” (sheriffs), previously appointed by
the king, were elected from among the citizens, and this right of election was
granted in perpetuity by’ Henry’s 1129 version. ‘The city exercised its jurisdic-
tion through a folkmoot of the entire citizenry meeting three times a year and
through a smaller court called a husting.’33 But in his new version of the
Charter, Henry I also agreed to reduce the annual tax from £500 to £300.
While the city’s 24 aldermen managed the city’s affairs independently,
Henry’s version makes it clear that they did so under the auspices of the
king as the source of and the authority behind their Charter. That is, they
ruled the City with the king’s blessing, ‘by the law of the lord king which
belongs to them in the city of London, saving the liberty of the city’.34
Though the king’s law applied in the City of London, the 1129 Charter confirms
that, by that date, the citizens could choose their own judges, and that those
judges alone and none others outside the city would determine cases involving
London citizens.35
Though there are suggestions that King Stephen (r 1134–1155) revoked the
earlier City of London Charters, that possibility is immaterial when interpreting
the meaning of Magna Carta, since King John had reissued the Charter on 5 July
1199 and had confirmed the annual payment to him at £300.36
29 ‘History of the government of the City of London’, City of London,,http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/
about-the-city/about-us/Pages/history-of-the-government-of-the-city-of-london.aspx., accessed 19
February 2016.
30 Ibid. See also McBain, ‘Liberties and customs’, p 32.
31 Berman, Law and Revolution, p 381, n 10.
32 McBain says this charter was issued by Henry I in 1132.
33 Berman, Law and Revolution, pp 381–382.
34 Ibid, p 382, quoting from the text of the 1129 Charter.
35 Ibid.
36 McBain ‘Liberties and customs’, p 38. See also Berman, Law and Revolution, p 383.
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Religious freedom in Magna Carta?
The religious freedom that was promised by King John and those who subse-
quently reissued Magna Carta was what we might now describe as ‘religious au-
tonomy’. While Magna Carta is often vaunted as ‘an original charter of human
rights’, save perhaps for the highest nobles, Englishmen and other Europeans in
the thirteenth century did not conceive of individual rights in any sense that
moderns would recognise. Indeed, the suggestion that, in 1215, Magna Carta
introduced a modern ‘freedom of conscience’ or confirmed it is grossly ana-
chronistic.37 To suggest that it was acceptable for anyone who qualified as a
‘free man’ under Magna Carta to go and worship in some other non-kosher
way would have been to endorse heresy, which was a crime as grievous as
treason against the person of the king.38 Jews and Moslems were not so much
exempt as irrelevant.39 They did not count as ‘free men’ to merit legal recogni-
tion at all, though they were very much recognised in commercial practice.40
To the extent that thirteenth-century Englishmen had modern rights at all,
they enjoyed their rights in communities and classes. Their rights were the
product of shared responsibility and the collective discharge of communal obli-
gations. Because the Church and the City of London were collectively strong
enough to withstand the prerogative demands of the king, they could bargain
with him on terms approaching equality. But individually no Church officer,
no matter how high, nor any baron or city official would dare to resist a
request or personal demand from the king. Their strength lay in their covenant
37 Baker, ‘Magna Carta and personal liberty’, pp 81 and 86. R Griffith-Jones and M Hill, ‘The relevance
and resonance of the Great Charter’ in Griffith Jones and Hill,Magna Carta, pp 3–18 at p 11, make a
similar point: ‘the most glaring omission was freedom of religion, the freedom to believe what one
believed. That was permitted only to Jews and infidels. Magna Carta, at the very beginning, con-
firmed the liberties of the Church, and those included its jurisdiction; and the Church, at the
time at least, was not tolerant of independent thought by Christians. Quite what the Church
meant by belief is difficult now to grasp, but it did not include an unbound exercise of sincere intel-
lectual judgment; that was forbidden on pain of death.’
38 See J Kilcullen, ‘The medieval concept of heresy’,,http://www.mq.edu.au/about_us/faculties_and_
departments/faculty_of_arts/mhpir/staff/staff-politics_and_international_relations/john_kilcullen/
the_medieval_concept_of_heresy/., accessed 19 February 2016, where Thomas Aquinas (1225–
1274) is cited as the authority for the death penalty for heretics, since corrupting faith is worse
than many other crimes which merit the death penalty.
39 Griffith-Jones and Hill, ‘Relevance and resonance’.
40 AlthoughWilliam the Conqueror valued ‘his Jews’ when he brought them with him from Normandy
in 1066, he and later kings treated them like chattels and could ‘mortgage them’. Twelfth- and
thirteenth-century English mortgages followed Jewish forms (J Rabinowitz, ‘The story of the mort-
gage retold’, (1945) 94University of Pennsylvania Law Review 94–109); since Jews could not own prop-
erty, when land was eventually forfeit in consequence of an unpaid mortgage (the processes for such
forfeiture were drawn out and complicated), it was forfeit to the king, who was thus joined at the hip
with his Jews and had an incentive to protect them. This generalised understanding goes some way
towards explaining ‘the anti-Semitic chapters’ in Magna Carta (Chapters 9, 10 and 11 of the original
1215 version) which were an important part of what the barons did insist on extracting from the king,
and which the ancient Church did not appear interested in moderating.
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solidarity and they knew it.41 Their opportunity to bargain with the king was the
fruit of an idea in the mind of the monk named Hildebrand who became Pope
Gregory VII as Pope Alexander II’s successor. Berman writes that Hildebrand’s
‘new religious and legal concepts and institutions and practices’ enabled urban-
isation and that they represent the watershed from which the whole Western
legal tradition has flowed. In time these ideas, institutions and charters would
generate demands for ‘rational and objective judicial procedures, equality of
rights, participation in lawmaking, representative government and statehood
itself’.42
Though Magna Carta is popularly represented as an extraction wrought by
noble intimidation tactics, a more complete understanding of the context recog-
nises that the barons, the Church and the City of London institutionally made an
informal religious covenant that they would stand collectively and hold this
unruly, turbulent and meddlesome king accountable to grand principles
already well founded in custom. Magna Carta was new in England because of
the number of classes it drew together onto the face of one document. That
was also a reason why it was later considered the ‘Great’ Charter, though that
label at the time merely distinguished it from the smaller Forest Charter,
which was issued alongside the 1217 and 1225 versions of Magna Carta.43 But
it was no novelty. Concords, treaties and charters had been used to resolve
similar and larger differences, normally seated in religious discord, on the
European continent for more than a hundred years.44 Thus William I was
well familiar with the concept as an expedient way to manage large towns and
cities when he came to England in 1066. That is why he set out the heads of
his agreement with the aldermen of the established City of London in documen-
tary form in that first year.
41 Griffith-Jones and Hill, ‘Relevance and resonance’, pp 5–7, discuss the extent to which Magna Carta
was the realisation of Archbishop Stephen Langton’s vision of ‘a biblical, covenantal kingship in
England’ and how he had invited the barons to St Paul’s Cathedral and produced the Coronation
Charter of Henry I in August 1213.
42 Berman, Law and Revolution, p 363. Although these concepts were new in England in the twelfth
century, they have more ancient origins in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Samuel appointed Saul
as the first Israelite King (1 Samuel 10 and 11) and then rejected him when he usurped Samuel’s func-
tion in administering religious ordinances (1 Samuel 15:26), but there was no prophet or seer with
equivalent authority after Samuel to reject David when he did likewise.
43 Vincent, Magna Carta, pp 84, 86.
44 Berman, Law and Revolution, p 87, states that ‘In 1075, after some twenty-five years of agitation and
propaganda by the papal party, Pope Gregory VII declared the political and legal supremacy of the
papacy over the entire church and the independence of the clergy from secular control. Gregory
also asserted the ultimate supremacy of the pope in secular matters, including the authority to
depose emperors and kings. The emperor – Henry IV of Saxony – responded with military
action. Civil war between the papal and imperial parties raged sporadically through Europe until
1122, when a final compromise was reached by a concordat signed in the German city of Worms.
In England and Normandy, the Concordat of Bec in 1107 had provided a temporary respite, but
the matter was not finally resolved there until the martyrdom of Archbishop Thomas Becket in 1170.’
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Hildebrand’s autonomy idea took root in England and spawned our modern
political institutions and power-sharing ideas. It is not my purpose to tease out
the length and breadth of that complex or the expanse of its legacy and influence,
but merely to observe that it was seated in the simple idea of Church autonomy –
the proposition that Church and State lived best together when they were autono-
mous, respected the integrity of the other and negotiated on terms of relative
equality when they had differences.
These ideas remain controversial. They were fought about as the Investiture
Contest of the twelfth century and they are now fought about as the culture wars
of the twenty-first century. John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum agree that the en-
during tension between church and state can only be resolved if it is accepted as
a ‘fixed star’ in Western jurisprudence that the state does not impose ‘orthodoxy’
in matters of religion.45 Nussbaum suggests that humans are forgetful and that
we need to relearn this solution in every generation because it is not
self-evident.46
SUBSIDIARITY, SPHERE-SOVEREIGNTY AND THE IDEA OF
AUTONOMY
Another indication that the fine detail as to how church and state are most wisely
separated is not self-evident can be seen in the evolution of the doctrines of sub-
sidiarity and sphere-sovereignty in the nineteenth century.47 It is beyond the
scope of this article to set out all the nuances of those doctrines or how they
have most recently developed, but I will identify them sufficiently to show
that they may be regarded as the restatement of an underlying autonomy idea
that was well established in the eleventh century.
A connection between the idea of religious and urban autonomy and the ideas
of subsidiarity and sphere-sovereignty will not be obvious to readers who are
only familiar with these latter ideas from Catholic and Calvinist social teaching,
beginning with the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1891. Nicholas Aroney
has, however, shown that the threads of meaning drawn together by Popes
Leo XIII, Pius XI and John Paul II, in 1891, 1931 and 1991 respectively, have
45 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, 1971), p 181; M Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience
(New York, 2008), pp 3–4 and 213. Both refer to the judgment of Justice Robert Jackson in West
Virginia Board of Education v Barnette 319 US 624 (1942) at 638.
46 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, pp 359–360.
47 Since the purpose of this section is to suggest that there is a connection between these recent social
ideas and the ideas of autonomy already traced, differentiating between subsidiarity and sphere-
sovereignty is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is appropriate to observe that they are
related ideas that have grown in parallel with sphere-sovereignty, coming from a Calvinist–Dutch
background in the early twentieth century.
2 8 2 CHURCH AND C I T Y L I B E R T I E S I N MAGNA CAR TA
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
distant roots in Aristotle and Aquinas.48 The same threads were also explored by
de Tocqueville when he wrote Democracy in America in 1835.49
De Tocqueville noted that centralised power ‘accustoms men to set their own
will habitually and completely aside’, and that the removal of any sense of indi-
vidual responsibility for the welfare of the village enabled the individual to ‘fold
his arms and wait till the whole nation comes to his aid’.50 He also said that
when a nation has reached the point where individuals
oscillate . . . between servitude and licence, [ fear of central bureaucrats and
expectation of benefit from their largesse], that nation must either change
its customs and its laws, or perish; for the source of public virtues is dried
up; and though it may contain subjects, it has not citizens.51
Undoubtedly similar insights into human character motivated the Conqueror in
his ‘settlement’ with the City of London in 1066, but they do not explain the
‘freedom of the Church’ which was also recognised in Magna Carta. That con-
cession of autonomy to the Church reads more like a species of mediaeval
de´tente, as the powers that were saw that they must accommodate one
another to avoid unending destructive conflict.
The Latin root of subsidiarity is subsidio, which literally means ‘to help’ or
‘aid’, but it is Catholic social teaching since 1891 that has provided the word ‘sub-
sidiarity’ with its contemporary meaning. For example, in 1891 in his encyclical
Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII implied that, while the state was obliged to act
against the secret combinations of men established for evil purposes, it had a
greater obligation to encourage private associations focused on free enterprise
and the common good.52 Pope Pius XI fleshed out these ideas in his 1931 encyc-
lical Quadragesimo Anno, which was subtitled ‘On the restoration of the social
order and perfecting it conformably to the precepts of the gospel’.53 This
second encyclical treating subsidiarity included this statement:
it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by
their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it
is an injustice . . . and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater
and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can
48 N Aroney, ‘Subsidiarity in the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas’ in M Evans and A Zimmerman
(eds), Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Dordrecht, 2014), pp 9–28 at p 12.
49 A de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans F Bowen (New York, 1994).
50 Ibid, pp 86 and 92.
51 Ibid, p 93.
52 Aroney, ‘Subsidiarity’, p 12.
53 Ibid, p 32.
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do. For every social activity ought . . . to furnish help to the members of the
body social, and never destroy and absorb them.
The supreme authority of the State ought . . . to let subordinate groups
handle matters of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its
efforts . . . the State will . . . do all things that belong to it alone . . . directing,
watching, urging restraining . . . [T]hose in power should be sure that the
more perfectly graduated order is kept among the various associations, in
observance of the principle of ‘subsidiarity function’ [to enable] . . . the
happier and more prosperous condition of the State.54
While it is doubtful that any English king considered that there was any moral
turpitude in depriving a subject or institution of the opportunity to work or of the
resulting work product if that deprivation served the public interest, all the kings
had a self-interested understanding of the value of a productive economy.55 King
John and his successors acknowledged this much in Magna Carta when they
agreed that they would not take or use property without compensation, and
when they allowed the City of London to govern itself in return for an annual
fee.56 They neither wished to discourage industry or patriotism. But scholars
in the US have observed a resurgence in the idea of the ancient freedom of
the Church coming from another direction.
In the introduction to their recent book The Rise of Corporate Liberty,
Schwartzman, Flanders and Robinson observe a transition in modern
American understanding of religious liberty ‘from individual liberty [back] to
[the] freedom of the church’ and ‘from freedom of the church to corporate
liberty’ evolving as a response to the 1991 Supreme Court decision in
Employment Division v Smith,57 which had limited the exemption of individual
religious practice in the face of generally applicable laws.58 In the
Hosanna-Tabor decision,59 ‘Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the First
Amendment gives “special solicitude to religious organizations”’ and in
Hobby Lobby,60 Justice Alito suggested that corporations are ‘reducible ultimate-
ly to the beliefs, values and interests of the people who compose them’.61 For
54 Ibid, p 35, quoting Quadragesimo Anno, pp 79 and 80.
55 See above n 31 and supporting text.
56 See, for example, clauses 28, 30 and 31 of the 1215 original version.
57 I Employment Division v Smith 494 US 872 (1990).
58 M Schwartzman, C Flanders and Z Robinson, The Rise of Corporate Liberty (Oxford, 2016), pp xv and
xvii.
59 Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School v EEOC 565 US ___(2012).
60 Burwell v Hobby Lobby 573 US___(2014).
61 Schwartzman, Flanders and Robinson, Rise of Corporate Liberty, pp xvi and xviii. The beginning of a
similar thread of jurisprudence may also be detected in a case in the Federal Court of Australia
decided in 2014 (Iliafi v The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Australia [2014] FCAFC 14).
In that case, the appellants had argued that they had ‘a right to worship publicly in their native lan-
guage’ (para 81) and that the respondent church’s decision ‘to discontinue Samoan-speaking wards
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these authors, however, the Hobby Lobby case ‘has now become a symbol for
something larger – about the role of corporations in constitutional law, about
the role of religion in the United States, and about the confluence of the two’
and the questions for religious liberty in the future will not be about individual
religious liberty.62 Rather, they will be about what government interests the
‘courts find sufficiently powerful to limit the freedom of religious organizations’
and how to ‘strike the proper balance’ between those interests and the interests
of third parties which may be harmed by them.63
When that forward-looking discussion is read alongside the observation that
the oldest version of religious freedom known in Western jurisprudence is insti-
tutional in nature, it is reasonable to suggest that religious liberty may be return-
ing to where it began. If that is so, it is further reasonable to suggest that in the
future religious liberty may be defended as the collective or the incorporated
interest of groups of like-minded individuals associated together for religious
or economic purpose. But the merger or confluence of religious freedom as
an associational right with economic undertones has a well-established if forgot-
ten jurisprudence of its own. In the final part of this article I will therefore note
how the ancient idea of a charter with religious covenantal language contributed
to England’s colonial expansion and the ring-fencing of her minority religions.
Again, it is beyond the scope of this article to set out all the nuances of the under-
lying legal doctrines or how they were developed, but I will provide examples to
show that religious liberty and royal charters have been comfortable bedfellows
for a very long time.
AUTONOMY UNDER OTHER CHARTERS
Before there was any concept of a commercial legal entity, groups of individuals
could not associate together for any reason, including trade, without royal sanc-
tion.64 Without commercial legitimacy, traders could not collect debts or enforce
the promises that people had made when receiving goods for which they could
not pay immediately. Since the crown was always interested in controlling the
. . . impaired’ that right. The Court observed ‘that the right to freedom of religion does not . . . guar-
antee an individual’s right to worship publicly in a particular language of importance to that individ-
ual’ (para 85), and that the appellants’ right to use their own language under A27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was to be exercised consistently with other provisions in that
Covenant. The appellant’s interpretation of A27 would interfere with the respondent church’s ‘right
to freedom of religion [under A18] that [wa]s being exercised by the Church on behalf of its adherents’
(para 99).
62 Schwartzman, Flanders and Robinson, Rise of Corporate Liberty, p xiii.
63 Ibid, p xx.
64 P Griffiths, A Licence to Trade: a history of the English chartered companies (London and Tonbridge,
1974), p x.
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economy, the issue of charters on terms including payment was a mutually
beneficial exercise.65 The export of wool to the Low Countries began well
before the Norman Conquest. Statutes and charters were issued to protect
foreign merchants and would exempt them from some local tolls in exchange
for payment of higher customs dues than were imposed on English
merchants.66
As a tool which provided the crown with a stream of revenue and a measure of
control over the economy while also giving autonomy and profit opportunity to
various collectives, the uses of charters proliferated. The new English colonies
on the American continent were also authorised and controlled by royal
charter. While it is not clear that the king was entirely aware of the non-
conforming mission of the first inhabitants of New England, Charles I
granted the New England Company a charter in March 1628 which provided
the new settlement with the legitimacy that enabled their support of continued
and increasing Puritan emigration.67 That charter remained in force for 55
years, until Charles II revoked it in 1684. Because its terms did not follow the
custom of requiring its board to sit in England, the New England company
had a practical independence which enabled its board to follow Puritan covenant
practices with very little royal oversight.68 Virginia’s charter was granted earlier,
on 10 April 1606. Eight named individuals were authorised to create a colony, to
spread the Christian gospel among the infidels and savages.69
The history of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in North America
also includes a famous charter. The Mormon people had been hounded from the
State of New York to Ohio, to Missouri and then to Illinois. In Illinois they were
initially received as refugees from religious persecution and allowed to develop a
malaria-infested swamp town called Commerce on the banks of the Mississippi.
But they were industrious and the town grew and was renamed Nauvoo. While
the people of Illinois were still sympathetic and the town was prospering, the
Latter-day Saints sought and obtained a charter from the legislature of Illinois
that had City of London spiritual genealogy. It was intended to enable local inde-
pendent city government and to protect the religious freedom of its citizens.
William E Berrett has written that Nauvoo’s charter
provided for broad legislative power resting in a city council consisting of a
mayor, four aldermen, and nine councilors elected by the qualified voters
of the city.
65 Schwartzman, Flanders and Robinson, Rise of Corporate Liberty, p ix.
66 Griffiths, Licence to Trade, pp 5–6.
67 W MacDonald, Documentary Source of American History 1606–1898 (New York, 1908), p 22.
68 Ibid.
69 See ‘First charter of Virginia’, available at ,http://www.bartleby.com/43/5.html., accessed 19
February 2016.
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It provided for a municipal court, independent of any but the Supreme
Court of the State and the Federal Courts.
It provided for a city militia to be known as the Nauvoo Legion, to be
equipped by the State and officered by citizens of Nauvoo.70
Like the City of London, within its city limits, ‘the city was independent of all
other agencies in the state. Only the repeal of the charter by the state legislature
could curtail these powers.’ Though others disagree, Berrett continues that ‘No
other municipality in America before or since has enjoyed such complete
control of its own affairs.’71 The Nauvoo Charter protected its citizens from
the Missouri mobs, who still hounded the Latter-day Saints even though they
had departed at gunpoint in accordance with the extermination order of
Lieutenant-Governor Lilburn W Boggs in late 1838.72 Under the Charter,
Nauvoo citizens could apply by writs of habeas corpus for independent review
of proceedings brought against their citizens in other jurisdictions, and this
power protected Joseph Smith from many attempts to extradite him back to
Missouri: though he had been released from one of their gaols when it
became obvious that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on any crim-
inal charge, it took many years for Missourian anti-Mormon hatred to abate.
Because of the generosity with which the Latter-day Saints were received by
the State of Illinois in Nauvoo, they renounced the isolation they had adopted
to survive in Missouri. The First Presidency of the Church in Nauvoo pro-
claimed that ‘fellow citizens of every denomination’ were welcome, as this
place was intended as a haven for people of good will from anywhere. One of
the first ordinances passed by the city council protected people of all faiths in
their undisturbed enjoyment of religious freedom, but another prohibited the
sale of hard liquor, effectively making Nauvoo an early prohibition town.73
Though Nauvoo experienced huge growth (though it never became as large as
Chicago, as some reports have suggested74), the Nauvoo experiment did not last.
As in Missouri, the growing size of Nauvoo threatened the previous political
70 W Berrett, The Restored Church: a brief history of the growth and doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, fifteenth edition (Salt Lake City, UT, 1973), p 158.
71 Ibid. However, Berrett appears to have been exaggerating just a little. J Walker, ‘Invoking habeas
corpus in Missouri and Illinois’ in G Madsen, J Walker and J Welch (eds), Sustaining the Law:
Joseph Smith’s legal encounters (Provo, UT, 2014), pp 357–399 at pp 363 and 376, observes that two
of five other city charters granted by the State of Illinois included habeas corpus protections for
their citizens. See also J Kimball, ‘Protecting Nauvoo by Illinois charter in 1840’ in ibid, pp 297–
307 at p 302.
72 Berrett, Restored Church, p 141. The ‘extermination order’ (Missouri Executive Order 44) was not for-
mally revoked until 1976. See ‘Extermination order rescinded’, ,https://www.lds.org/ensign/1976/
09/news-of-the-church/extermination-order-rescinded?lang=eng., accessed 8 June 2016.
73 Berrett, Restored Church, p 159.
74 L Arrington and D Bitton, The Mormon Experience: a history of the Latter-day Saints, second edition
(Urbana, IL, 1972), p 69. In June 1844, the church historian Franklin D. Richards ‘placed the popu-
lation at 14,000’ (Berrett, Restored Church, p 160).
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power of non-Latter-day Saints communities in Warsaw and Carthage. Those
towns also resented the autonomy which the Nauvoo Charter provided to its citi-
zens and particularly to the Mormon leader, Joseph Smith. After Smith’s assas-
sination on 27 June 1844, the Nauvoo Charter was revoked by the legislature on
29 January 1845 and soon thereafter, when it became clear that no peace was pos-
sible between the Latter-day Saints and other locals, the Church leaders nego-
tiated a truce with their neighbours so that they could prepare for yet another
exodus, this time to the Salt Lake Valley in what is now the State of Utah.75
WHAT FUTURE FOR CHARTERS AS INSTRUMENTS OF RELIGIOUS
AUTONOMY AND FREEDOM?
The City of London’s original charters saw aldermen, merchants, craftsmen and
other service providers make covenants together about peace and protection that
were sourced in mutual religious understanding. Although they were separate
from the Church, they drew their understanding and values from the Church.
In many eleventh- and twelfth-century European towns and cities, these coven-
ant obligations were confirmed with oaths of loyalty and obedience to law.
Covenant solidarity secured citizens against military and other action by other
powers. In August 1213, Archbishop Stephen Langton envisioned ‘a biblical, cov-
enantal kingship in England’ when he invited the barons to St Paul’s Cathedral
and unfolded the terms of Henry I’s coronial charter of 1100 to them anew.76 The
New World citizens of Virginia and Boston also secured their safety and their
religious freedom through the autonomy enabled by charters issued by
English kings. The City of Nauvoo in nineteenth-century Illinois gained its au-
tonomy and religious freedom through a charter issued by the State of Illinois.
Nowadays, when we speak of charters, we intend more aspirational docu-
ments. Formal legal protection is more often provided by statutes, but it was
not always so. Magna Carta is the most famous example of an instrument
which followed earlier precedents and was intended to confirm and secure au-
tonomy for various groups against excessive government intervention in their
affairs.
Most Western democracies now seek to protect values with bills of rights and
constitutions. But charters have their place. Consider Australia, where there is
no national bill of rights but where the State of Victoria and the Australian
Capital Territory have passed bills of rights to remedy a perceived lacuna in
75 The Illinois legislature issued a statement of regret (Resolution 627) to the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints in April 2004. See ‘160 years later, Illinois ready to offer Mormons an apology’,
Chicago Tribune, 7 April 2004, ,http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-04-07/news/0404070268_
1_mormons-armand-mauss-latter-day-saints., accessed 19 February 2016.
76 Griffith-Jones and Hill, ‘Relevance and Resonance’, pp 5–7.
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the protection of civil liberties.77 The State of Victoria calls its bill The Charter of
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. The South African Constitution also
anticipates the issue of further charters to protect citizen rights and freedoms
more fully, including religious freedom.78
Human rights instruments have proliferated around the world since the end
of the Second World War, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set
out aspirational standards intended to avoid further world wars. But, at the
same time as countries have aspired to prevent war with Magna Carta-like
written instruments, the world has been balkanising in consequence of imperial
decolonisation and as groups of people within nations have sought autonomies
different from those they inherited as their political birthright. Some countries
resist any suggestion of such autonomy with violence.79 Others find democratic
solutions.80 William the Conqueror’s 1066 London Charter balanced his eco-
nomic interests against the desires of the people of that city for limited auton-
omy. Later sovereigns have also used charters and charter-like agreements to
balance economic and political interests in the interests of peaceful co-existence.
Magna Carta created an idea that arrived internationally when Eleanor
Roosevelt described the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as
‘the international Magna Carta for all mankind’.81 But the idea of rights which
the UDHR introduced and claimed for the world is also evolving as groups of
people seek new forms of autonomy and self-determination. Examples of
those new interests are identified when we consider current maps showing
the twentieth-century nations and ask how the boundaries will be changed as
the decades of the twenty-first century unfold. Will there be homelands for
Palestinians, Armenians and Kurds? Will the European Union survive to be
joined by more Eastern European nations and will the United Kingdom leave
after its experiment of more than 40 years? Or will the European Union be frac-
tured by debt? Just as Pope Gregory VII’s revolution in the twelfth century
spawned the idea of nation-states, so the insight that groups of people have col-
lective rights that may be more important than the rights of the individuals who
compose those groups seems set to transform the world again.
77 G Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne, 1967), p 208, called Australia ‘the frozen
continent’ since it was so averse to constitutional change. More recently, G Williams, S Brennan
and A Lynch, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (Leichhardt, NSW, 2014), para 26.38, observed
that ‘Australia is now the only democratic country without a national Bill of Rights’.
78 Section 234 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides: ‘In order to deepen the
culture of democracy established by the Constitution, Parliament may adopt Charters of Rights con-
sistent with this Constitution.’
79 For example, Chinese resistance to the religion of the Dalai Lama and Falun Gong suggest Chinese
Communist Party concern with any organisational authority that could challenge the party’s legitim-
acy, however benign.
80 For example, the secession referenda inWestern Australia (1933), Quebec (1995) and Scotland (2014).
81 See ‘A brief history of human rights’, United for Human Rights, ,http://www.humanrights.com/
what-are-human-rights/brief-history/the-united-nations.html., accessed 19 February 2016.
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CONCLUSION
In this article I have observed that the idea of ‘freedom of the Church’ may be on
the cusp of a resurrection. Renewed interest in freedom of the Church is not the
primary product of the advocacy of religious liberty, though in the US it does
respond to the narrowing of individual religious exemptions from state action
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v Smith.
Modern freedom of the Church is rather a manifestation of the idea that associ-
ational freedom is at least as important as individual freedom and may be even
more important, since the rights of a group of human individuals must be more
important than the individual rights of one member of the group. That larger
idea of association freedom has not yet trickled down to inform religious
liberty debates in democratic nations beyond the US. However, such trickle-
down seems inevitable, as international interest in the idea of association
freedom is manifest in post-colonial lobbying for homelands for various indi-
genous peoples and in the jockeying of countries that wish to join and leave
the European Union.
This article suggests that, if associational freedom does gain a foothold as a
tool in the hands of religious liberty advocates, there is a vast deposit of associ-
ational understanding waiting to be mined. That understanding includes the
recognition that it was associational freedom that underlay the establishment
and the success of both the City of London and the British Empire.
While Magna Carta was not the first Anglo-American charter, there are
several senses in which it was the greatest. Certainly it was larger than the
Forest Charter, following the subdivision of Magna Carta’s clauses in 1217; and
it was the largest English charter ever conceived in the sense that it drew to-
gether the king, the lords, the merchants, the townsfolk and free men generally.
But its meaning as an icon and as an emblem of liberty continues to exceed its
written terms. It is and has been larger than life since it was first reissued by the
new king in 1217.
The suggestion of this article is that two of its four unrepealed clauses are
ready and waiting to contribute another round of human freedom to the
world. For Magna Carta’s idea that the Church and the City of London were
always entitled to associational freedom and autonomy despite the demands
of King John as the state executive has timeless resonance. Those clauses
confirm that successful states do not have to rule or control every aspect of
human life and association.
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